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Recent Cases
EMINENT DOMN-CovENANT By GRN= To SEL ONLY PRODUCTS OF
GRANTOR Is COENANT RuNNING wrm LAND FOR WINC GANro's
SUCCESSOR DUE COWENSArxON.-In March, 1948, the owners of a
wholesale oil products distributing business sold and conveyed a fill-
ing station through which they were retailing their products. As
part of the consideration, the grantee agreed that he, his heirs and
assigns would for fifteen years thereafter handle only the oil products
distributed by the grantors, their heirs and assigns. The terms of
this agreement were recited in the deed. In November, 1948, the
plaintiffs acquired the distributing business, together with the grantors'
rights under the agreement. The filling station passed through sev-
eral owners, all of whom bought only the plaintiff's products. In
1957, the Commonwealth of Kentucky condemned the property for
highway purposes, and in March, 1958, the station was destroyed in
the course of construction. When the state refused to recognize that
the plaintiffs had any interest in the property for which compensation
was due, they brought this action. The trial court concluded that
the plaintiffs merely had a contractual right to furnish the filling
station owners supplies for sale and dismissed the complaint. Held:
Reversed, with two judges dissenting. The agreement constituted a
restrictive covenant running with the land in favor of the grantors
and their successors in the distributing business. The plaintiffs were
entitled to compensation for the destruction of their contractual
right to have the property used as a retail outlet for their products.
Folger v. Commonwealth, 380 S.W.2d 106 (1959).
This case presents two novel issues equally worthy of examin-
ation: (1) Where the grantee of land agrees in the deed of convey-
ance to use in connection with a business which he plans to operate
on the premises only the products sold by the grantors (a) does the
burden of this agreement run with the land against subsequent
grantees, and (b) may the benefit thereof be assigned by the grantors
to their successors in business? (2) If the property is subsequently
condemned for public use, must the grantors' successors be compen-
sated for the loss of their rights under the agreement? To recover,
the plaintiffs in the principal case needed favorable answers to both
of these questions. For unless they had an enforceable right under
the agreement when the property was condemned, there was noth-
ing on which to base a claim for compensation.
Insofar as it holds that the burden of this covenant will run with
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the land, the principal case is a matter of first impression in Ken-
tucky. In the two previous cases which have dealt with this type
of agreement, Trosper v. Shoemaker' and Knight v. Hamilton,2 the
party against whom enforcement was sought was the original grantee.
Hence the question whether the covenant ran with the land so as to
bind subsequent grantees was not presented.
It is generally accepted that in order for the burden of a restric-
tive covenant to run with the land, either at law or in equity, so as
to bind successive owners of the property, the covenant must touch
and concern the land.3 Two jurisdictions which have considered
whether the kind of covenant involved in the principal case touches
and concerns the land have reached opposite conclusions. In Smith
v. Gulf Refining Co.,4 the grantor was held entitled to an injunction
against violation of the agreement by the grantee's successor. In
reaching this result, the Georgia court concluded that the covenant
related directly to the mode of enjoyment of the estate conveyed.5
It is submitted, however, that the real basis for its decision is set
forth in the following language:
Evidently the intention of the parties to the deed was that for the
term specified the products of a certain company should be sold
there-the products of a company in which the grantor had an
interest- and it is inferrable that he would not have conveyed the
property to the grantee without the protection which rests upon
the stipulation against the sale of the products of any other com-
pany than that named.6 [Emphasis added.]
This line of reasoning, of which traces can be found in the Kentucky
cases,7 is contrary to the accepted principle that unless the covenant
1312 Ky. 844, 227 S.W.2d 176 (1949).
2313 Ky. 858, 233 S.W.2d 969 (1950).
32 American Law of Property §§ 9.13, 9.25 n. 16 (Casner ed. 1952)
(hereinafter referred to as Am. Law Prop.). See also Note, 45 Ky. L. J. 637
(1957). Clark, Covenants and Interests Running with Land 96-7 (2d ed.
1947), points out: "It has been found impossible to state any absolute tests
to determine what covenants touch and concern land and what do not. The
question is one for the courts to determine in the exercise of its best judg-
ment upon the facts of each case." [Footnote omitted.] In Ferguson v. Wor-
rall, 125 Ky. 618, 627, 101 S.W. 966, 968 (1907), the Kentucky court
adopted this view:
Whether a covenant will or will not run with the land does not ...
so much depend on whether it is to be performed on the land itself,
as on whether it tends directly or necessarily to enhance its value
or render it more beneficial or convenient to those by whom it is
used or occupied.
The present case involves the converse of this proposition; i.e., the covenant
directly reduces the value of the land and renders its enjoyment less beneficial
to the owner or occupier.
4 162 Ga. 191, 134 S.E. 466 (1926).
5 134 S.E. at 448.
6 Ibid.
7 In TrosVer v. Shoemaker, 312 Ky. 344, 227 S.W.2d 176 (1949), the
deed recited: 'This is a covenant running with the land hereinabove described,
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touches and concerns the land, it cannot run, no matter how clearly
the parties indicate their desire that it do so.
8
In Montgomery v. Creager,9 a Texas court refused to enforce
a similar restriction in a contract for dissolution of a partnership
against one partner's subsequent grantee with notice. It stated:
We do not believe the view is correct that the contract provides
for a restricted use of the filling station. The contract was one for
the purchase and sale of gasoline. The filling station is only im-
portant as identifying the subject-matter of the contract; namely,
such gasoline as is sold at the filling station. The agreement, if it
could properly be called a covenant [sic], is certainly not such as
attaches to the property, but it is purely personal between [the
partaers]. . . .1o
The court went on to say that even a covenant which is enforceable
in equity against a subsequent purchaser of the property with notice
thereof must directly relate to or concern the land, its use or enjoy-
ment; it is not sufficient that it affect the use or enjoyment of the
property in an indirect fashion.'1
Assuming, however, that a covenant of this nature does touch and
concern the burdened land, it may be precluded from running with
the land on still another ground. Namely, the benefit is in gross;
i.e., there is no particular property which is benefited by the terms
of the agreement. Doubtless when the covenant involved in the
present case was made, the grantors owned some real estate in con-
nection with their distributing business. However, the benefit did
not attach thereto, but to the business itself. Had the grantors moved
their establishment to a new location, they would still have been
able to enforce the covenant against the grantee. The plaintiffs are
entitled to enforce the covenant (if at all) as the grantors' successors
in the distributing business, and not as the grantees of their real
property.
12
and this covenant also binds the second party and his heirs, successors and
assigns herein." Id. at 845, 277 S.W.2d at 177. The court there indicated its
willingness to give effect to this expression of the parties' intention, saying:
The deed must be construed ...in the light of the situation of theparties at the time the deed was executed, their purpose in inserting
the restriction, .... and the end to be obtained by the restriction ....
Appellee [the grantor] . . . was no doubt interested in having as
many outlets as possible for the distribution of his products. He did
not have to sell his interest in the property ....
Id. at 847, 227 S.W.2d at 178. Evidently it was this dictum which the court in
the principal case relied upon for its authority. See 830 S.W.2d at 107.
2 Am. Law Prop. 9.10, at 366; Restatement, Property § 531, comment
a (1944).
922 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
1o Id. at 466.
11 Ibid.
12 "We must next determine whether grantors' successor in the distributing
business is entitled to enforce the covenant.... 330 S.W.2d at 108. This raises
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Although there is no real policy in this country against allowing
the burden of a covenant to run solely because the benefit is in
gross,' 3 several courts have refused to do so in particular cases on
the ground that it is undesirable to encumber a fee simple estate
where there is no corresponding benefit to other land.14 Other juris-
dictions, however, have enforced a covenant against the grantee of
the burdened land both at law and in equity despite the fact that
the benefit was personal to the covenantee. 15
So far this comment has considered the covenant in the principal
case as a negative restriction on the use of the property conveyed;
i.e., an agreement not to use any oil products other than those sold
by the grantors or their successors. However, a plausible argument
can be made that this agreement imposes on the grantee an affirm-
ative duty to purchase all oil products sold in the premises from the
grantors or their successors in the distributing business. Such an
interpretation raises the additional problem whether the burden
of an affirmative covenant will run with the land.
Following the lead of the English courts, which have refused to
enforce affirmative agreements against subsequent purchasers with
notice, 16 a few American cases limited enforcement of affirmative
the question of the assignability of a benefit in gross. In Trosper v. Shoe-
maker, 312 Ky. 344, 227 S.W.2d 176 (1949), the Kentucky court held that a
similar covenant could be enforced by the grantor's successor in the distributing
business. The court in the instant case relied on this authority to find that the
plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of the covenant. 330 S.W.2d at 108.
Elsewhere there is little authority for or against assignment of a benefit
in gross, either at law or in equity. 2 Am. Law Prop. § 9.32, at 430 suggests
that equitable servitudes in gross may be treated as personal to the promises
on the same grounds that easements in gross have been held non-assignable by
a majority of American courts. On this latter point see 2 id. §§ 8.75-.83. The
Restatement of Property distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial
easements in gross, allowing alienation of the former as a matter of law and
leaving assignability of the latter to be decided on the facts of the particular
case. Restatement, Property §§ 389, 491 (1944). The covenant in the principal
case is analogous to a commercial easement in gross.
13 2 Am. Law Prop § 9.13, at 375. Compare Restatement, Property § 537,
comment a (1944), which takes the position that there is a strong policy against
the running of a burden unless there is a corresponding benefit to land rather
than to a person or business. Moreover, the Restatement does not permit the
burden to run in any case where the benefit is in gross and the covenant deals
'with the use of the covenantor's land. Id. § 543, comment c. For a criticism
of this position see Clark, "The American Law Institute's Law of Real Cov-enants," 52 Yale L. J. 699, 708-12, 723-5 (1943).
'4 2 Am. Law Prop. §§ 9.13 n. 10, 9.32.
15 2 id. §§ 9.13 n. 11, 9.32, at 430 n. 7. See Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430,
113 A. 2d 492 (1955), where an agreement which gave the plaintiff the exclu-
sive right to install and maintain a juke-box in a luncheonette was enforced
against a subsequent purchaser of the business with knowledge thereof. The
implications of this case are discussed in Chafee, "The Music Goes Round and
Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1250 (1956).
16 Haywood v. Brunswick Bldg. Soc'y, 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881). However, in
several cases the English courts have enjoined commission of a particular act
which would constitute a breach of the armative duty. See Clegg v. Hands, 44
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covenants to certain types, such as those concerning fences or party
walls.17 Several more recent decisions have expressly declared that
a covenant with respect to the use of land which is essentially affirm-
ative in nature may be enforced against any subsequent grantee with
knowledge thereof.' 8 Most courts, however, have not distinguished
between the running of affirmative as compared with negative burdens
in covenants, whether enforcement is sought at law or in equity.19
In Ferguson v. Worrall 20 the Kentucky court construed an agreement
which imposed on anyone using a party wall the obligation to re-
imburse the builder for part of the cost thereof as a covenant run-
ning with the land, without describing the burden as an affirmative
one. Thus, in Kentucky, as in most jurisdictions, whether the burden
of a covenant is affirmative or negative apparently has little bearing
on whether it will run with the land.
Accepting for the moment the court's decision that the plain-
tiffs had an enforceable contract right in the property, let us now
consider whether they must be compensated for the loss of that
right by condemnation of the property.
Under section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution, no man's prop-
erty may be taken or applied to public use without just compen-
sation being paid to him. The purpose of such provisions as this is
to redistribute among the general population certain economic losses
which are inflicted on those who happen to lie in the path of a
public or quasi-public improvement.21 However, as the Supreme
Court has pointed out, such provisions do "not undertake . . . to
socialize all losses, but those only which result from a taking of
property."22 [Emphasis added.] Therefore, before one whose eco-
nomic position is adversely affected by the exercise of the power
of eminent domain is entitled to compensation, he must show that
some property of his was taken.
Ch. D. 503 (1890), Luker v. Dennis, 7 Ch. D. 227 (1877), Catt v. Tourle,
L. R. 4 Ch. App. 653 (1869). This suggests that refusal to enforce affirmative
agreements may rest upon the difficulty of supervising performance thereof
rather than any policy against the running of affirmative burdens per se. See
2 Am. Law Prop. § 9.36, at 438.
17 See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. New York & Q. C. Ry., 253
N.Y. 190, 170 N.E. 887 (1930); Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114
(1913); 2 Am. Law Prop. §§ 9.16, 9.36, at 438.
Is See, e.g., Nordin v. May, 188 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1951); Murphy v. Kerr,
5 F. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925); Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319,
41 N.E. 441 (1895).
19 2 Am. Law Prop. §§ 9.16 n. 5, 9.32, at 439; Annots., 118 A.L.R. 982
(1939), 102 A.L.R. 781 (1936), 41 A.L.R. 1363 (1926).
20o125 Ky. 618, 101 S.W. 966 (1907). See also Flege v. Covington & C.
Elevated Ry. & Transfer & Bridge Co., 122 Ky. 348, 91 S.W. 738 (1906).
21 See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
22 Ibid.
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The plaintiffs in the instant case should have had little difficulty
with the first requirement, for it is well settled that an enforceable
contract right constitutes property for which compensation must be
made if it is taken for public use.23 The more difficult question, but
one to which the court gave little consideration,24 is whether this con-
tract right was in fact taken.
Exercise of the power of eminent domain has been said to affect
contractual rights in two ways: (1) the rights themselves may be
directly appropriated for public use; or (2) they may be frustrated
by the taking of other property to which they pertain.2 5 As has
just been pointed out, where there is a direct appropriation just
compensation must be made. On the other hand, frustration inci-
dental to the condemnation of other property has been held to re-
quire compensation only where the contract is considered part of
the res taken.
2 6
In applying the last proposition to the condemnation of real prop-
erty, some courts have concluded that the contract is not part of the
res, and therefore is not "taken", unless the person benefited is
thereby given some "interest" or "estate" in the land.2 7 In many in-
stances, whether or not a person has such an "interest or estate" pre-
sents little difficulty. For example, most courts recognize that a tenant
under a lease for a term of years has an interest in property sufficient
to enable him to share in the compensation awarded when all or part
of the leasehold is taken or damaged by the exercise of eminent do-
23 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Annot., 152 A.L.R.
307, 808-9 (1944). See also 18 Am. Jur. Eminent Domain § 160, at 790 (1938)
(cited in the principal case).
24See note 26 infra.
25 Annot., 152 A.L.R. 307 (1944).
26See Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923);
Annot., 152 A.L.R. 307, 309 (1944). Clearly in the principal case the plaintiffs'
rights under the covenant were not directly taken by condemnation of the filling
station but rather were frustrated thereby. However, the majority of the court
apparently disregarded the distinction between these two situations, and simply
found that the plaintiffs' rights had been "destroyed by the taking." 330 S.W.2d
at 108. This attitude may be explained in part by the wording of Ky.,Const.
§ 242, which provides that just compensation must be made for property taken,
injured or destroyed" by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. By a
forced interpretation of this provision frustration of contract rights such as oc-
curred in this case could be construed as an injury to or destruction of property.
27 18 Am. Jur. Eminent Domain § 160 (Supp. 1959, at 105); Annot., 152
A.L.R. 307, 810 (1944). It should be noted, however, that there are interests
(such as a tenancy at will) which constitute recognized estates in land, but
whose owners are not entitled to compensation when the land condemned. See,
e.g., Petry v. City & County of Denver, 123 Colo. 509, 233 P. 2d 867 (1951)
(lease termniable on 30 days' notice); Millhouse v. Drainage District No. 48
of Dunklin County, 304 S.W. 2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (lease terminable at
will). The apparent grounds for denial of recovery are that the right is incapable
of evaluation or is not significant enough to be considered in arriving at the
compensation for the land taken. Annot., 152 A.L.R. 307, 312 (1944).
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main during the term of the lease.28 However, where, as in the present
case, a contract creates rights concerning land which are not capable
of classification as one of the customary interests or estates in real
property, compensation has been required or withheld on a case-
to-case basis in such a manner that no criteria for doing so has been
established.
29
On the other hand, some courts, notably those of New York, have
declined "to grope about in the mysterious world of 'estates' and
'interests not estates."' 3 0 Instead, they have taken the practical posi-
tion that regardless of its source a right with respect to property
taken by eminent domain should be disregarded in awarding com-
pensation only where it is too remote or incapable of evaluation.31
Notice that this is a two-pronged test of compensation. When it is
applied, a right may be disregarded for the purpose of compensation
even though it is capable of evaluation if the relation which it bears
to the land condemned is too remote.
32
The rule which the Kentucky court laid down in the principal
case may be summarized in this manner: When contract rights
are destroyed by the condemnation of real property for public use,
the owner of such rights is entitled to compensation unless the in-
terest or estate created thereby is so remote as to be incapable of
evaluation. This represents a cross between the "estate or interest"
requirement and the "remoteness and capability of evaluation" stand-
ards of the New York rule. In the process, however, the Kentucky
court made one alteration in the latter principle, which may have
affected the outcome of the principle case. Where the New York
courts disregard those rights which are too remote or incapable
of evaluation, the Kentucky court chose to ignore only interests and
estates which are "so remote as to be incapable of evaluation." Due
to the emphasis thus placed on remoteness, when the majority ap-
plied this rule to the facts of the instant case, they concluded that
28 See, e.g., City of Ashland v. Price, 318 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1958); see also
cases cited in 18 Am. Jur. Eminent Domain § 232 n. 8 (1938).
29 See Annot., 152 A.L.R. 307, 312-17 (1944).
30 United States v. 531/4 Acres of Land, 139 F. 2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1944).
31 Ibid.; see also Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal v. City of New York, 139
F. 2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 747 (1944); 18 Am. Jur.
Eminent Domain § 160 (Supp. 1959, at 105).
32 The significance of the remoteness aspect of this rule may be illustrated
by this example. Suppose the owner of a drive-in restaurant contracts to buy
certain quantities of food supplies from a certain wholesaler for five years at a
reduced price. After two years, the drive-in is condemned. May the wholesaler
recover from the condemnor for any loss he sustained due to frustration of the
contract? The value of the contract to him can be quickly and accurately ascer-
tained. However, any court when asked to decide this question could, and
probably would, say, "The wholesaler's rights under the contract were so remotely
connected with the real estate on which the restaurant was located that he is
not entitled to compensation."
1960]
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the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation solely because their in-
terest in the property was "immediate" and not at all remote, with-
out considering the problem of evaluation.
Had the court undertaken to evaluate the plaintiffs' rights under
the covenant, they would have had to consider these variable fac-
tors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiffs or their successors would
have continued in the distributing business for the rest of the term;
(2) the possibility that the owner of the premises might have ceased
to operate a filling station thereon; and (3) the volume of business
which might have been done in the several oil products distributed
by the plaintiffs and their margin of profit on each.33 In the present
case evaluation would not be entirely impossible. Factor (3) could
be estimated by projecting established business patterns through the
remainder of the period. The resulting figure could then be discounted
by factors (1) & (2). However, had the filling station been con-
demned shortly after the original conveyance, before any patterns
of business had been established, not only would the plaintiffs' poten-
tial loss have been much greater, but also much harder to evaluate.
Yet no court could with consistency require compensation in the
first case and deny it in the latter.
After extensive consideration, this writer has concluded that
there is no set of criteria that will indicate in every instance with
absolute certainty which rights connected with the property con-
demned must be compensated for. Keeping this in mind, the rule
enunciated by the New York courts, the gist of which was adopted
by the Kentucky court in the principal case, appears to offer a guide
for attorneys and courts alike which will be adequate in most cases.
Moreover, it comes closer to achieving the purpose behind the con-
stitutional provisions on which compensation is based.
Although the particular situation presented by the facts of the
principal case is unlikely to reoccur frequently, this decision will no
doubt have widespread ramifications in Kentucky eminent domain
law. Just how far the court will extend the rule of the principal case
remains to be seen. Certainly counsel for a condemnor would be well
advised to join in the condemnation proceedings all persons having
any rights with respect to the property condemned which may pos-
sibly fall within the scope of this decision, including those created
by covenants and contracts. 34 Only in this way can the condemnor be
33 Some of the difficulties encountered in evaluating the plaintiff's rights
under the agreement were pointed up by Chief Justice Montgomery in his dis-
senting opinion. 330 S.W. 2d at 108.
34 In the event the property is purchased rather than condemned, the purch-
aser should obtain a release from these persons of any interest they might have
in the property.
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certain that the verdict will represent the value of all interests in the
property. In borderline situations, such as the principal case, an-
other proceeding among the condemnees may be necessary to de-
termine the extent, if any, to which each is entitled to share in the
proceeds.
John T. Bondurant
MUNAMEAL CORPOBRAONS - CoNsimmoNAL LAW - LiABmrry OF
EMPLOYEES.- Defendant Erwin operated a fire truck as an employee
of the City of Mayfield. In response to a call to help fight a fire in
Murray, he was driving outside the corporate limits of Mayfield when
his truck and the vehicle of the plaintiff were involved in an ac-
cident. This action was brought against Erwin1 for his alleged neg-
ligence. The trial court dismissed the complaint, relying on Kentucky
Revised Statutes2 section 95.830(2), which provides in part: "Neither
the city nor its officers or employees shall be liable in any manner on
account of the use of the [fire] apparatus at any point outside of
the corporate limits of the city. . . ." An appeal was taken. Held:
Reversed, two judges dissenting. The statute freeing members of
city fire departments from personal liability for their negligent acts
is violative of two sections of the Kentucky Constitution: section 14,
which provides, "all courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered with-
out sale, denial, or delay" and section 54, which provides, "the Gen-
eral Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be re-
covered for ... injuries to person or to property." Both of these sec-
tions were intended to preserve those jural rights which had become
well established prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Happy v.
Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959)
The statutory provision invalidated in the Happy case was evi-
dently part of the legislature's answer to Jefferson County Fiscal
Court v. Jefferson County,3 which declared that a city's contract to
furnish fire protection to the surrounding county was ultra vires and
void. KRS section 95.830, enacted the following year, furnished cities
with the power which had been shown to be lacking in the Jefferson
County case. It also contained the provision in question freeing fire-
1 The City of Mayfield, the City of Murray, and the liability insurance
carriers of the two cities were also defendants, but their positions are not relevant
here.
2 Hereinafter referred to as KRS.
3 278 Ky. 785, 129 S.W.2d 554, 122 A.L.R. 1151 (1939).
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